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LETTERS OF CREDIT-NEGOTIABLE INSTRUhIENTS
The commercial letter of credit, viewed as a piece of financial
machinery, has functioned very satisfactorily. Notwithstanding
its long and extensive use, it has occasioned relatively little liti-
gation. This may be ascribed in part to the well defined busi-
ness and banking understanding of the rights and duties growing
out of a letter of credit and also to the fact that houses handling
such transactions have little desire to litigate questions of law,
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however interesting theoretically. Owing to the unsettled con-
ditions existing during and immediately following the War, how-
ever, recourse has been had to the courts in many cases. As
a consequence, within the last decade, American courts, notably
those of New York and Massachusetts, have been called
upon to write much. letter of credit law. The major provisions
have been well drafted. There remain a number of important
sections to adopt.
The ordinary irrevocable documentary import credit, in its
simplest form, represents a transaction between three principal
parties: buyer, the applicant for the credit and prospective in-
demnitor of the bank; bank, the opener of the credit; and seller,
the beneficiary of the credit. The orthodox legal view has been
that this sets up three separate and distinct contracts, though
of course all relating to the same transaction. These are the
seller-buyer sales contract, the seller-bank payment contract,
and the buyer-bank reimbursement contract. That these are
distinct and give rise to independent sets of legal relations is
apparent when it is considered that the bank may not refuse per-
formance, for example, on the ground that the buyer has failed to
carry out the buyer-bank contract., Nor may the bank refuse
payment on the ground that the seller has improperly performed
the seller-buyer contract.? Likewise, even though the bank has
paid against an improper shipment, if the documents presented
to it by the seller complied with the terms of the credit, it is
entitled to reimbursement from the buyer on the buyer-bank
contract.3 To this extent, the independence and enforceability of
these contracts is clearly borne out by the decisions. 4 The dif-
ficulty has been to reconcile these results with the rest of our
law and to provide a theory which will enable a court to decide,
on common law principles and at the same time in consonance
with business custom, certain other cases which may be expected
to arise. The troublesome points are (1) to find consideration
for the bank's undertaking, and (2) to make this undertaking ir-
1 American Steel Co. v. Irving National Bank, 266 Fed. 41 (C. C. A
2d, 1920); of. Russell v. Wiggin, 2 Story, 213, Fed. Cas. No. 12, 165 (1842).
20'Meara v. National Park Bank of New York, 239 N. Y. 386, 146 N. E.
636 (1925); (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 775.
3 Laudisi v. American Exchange Nat'l Bank, 239 N. Y. 234, 146 N. E.
347 (1924) ; Frey and Son v. Sherburne, 193 App. Div. 849, 184 N. Y. Supp.
661 (1st Dept. 1920).
Bank of Plant City v. Canal-Commercial Trust & Savings Bank, 270
Fed. 477 (C. C. A. 5th, 1921); International Banking Corporation v. Irving
National Bank, 274 Fed. 122 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); Bank of America v.
Whitney Nat'l Bank, 291 Fed. 929 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923); Lamborn v. Lake
Shore Banking & Trust Co., 196 App. Div. 504, 188 N. Y. Supp. 162 (lst
Dept. 1921); Bank of Taiwan v. Gorgas-Pierie Mfg. Co., 273 Fed. 660
(C. C. A. 3d, 1921).
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revocable, in accordance with its terms, from the moment it is
issued2
In the recent case of Second Natono. Baak v. Sa mul & Sonzs,
12 Fed. (2d) 963 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) the court was atked to
decide whether a bank, which had discounted for a seller a draft
drawn under an irrevocable credit, but which due to delay in
the mail had not been presented to the bank issuing the credit
until the day after the expiry date of the credit, had any rights
against the buyer. The only documents called for by the credit
were the invoices of sale, the buyer apparently having taken
delivery of the goods. The issuing bank refused to honor the
haft owing to the late presentment, and the buyer on its part
refused to consent to late payment. The court viewed the letter
of credit as being in the nature of a negotiable instrument and
reasoned that if a presentment of a bill or note may in some
cases be sufficient to charge secondary parties, though made
after the maturity date, the same should apply to letters of
credit. It then interpreted the buyer's refusal to authorize pay-
ment as an act inducing a breach of contract, and held that the
buyer, as a tort-feasor, should be responsible in indebitatus as-
sumpsit. This, of course, involved holding that the credit did
not expire as its terms provided, but at some indefinite time
thereafter, a result opposed to the bandng notion of limited
term credits,6 and not supported by authority. T
G For a discussion of the various common law theories advanced to e.plain
the letter of credit cases see McCurdy, Commercial Lettcrs of Credit (1922)
35 HARv. L. REv. 539; Mead, Documnctary Letters of Credit (1922) 22 CoT.
L. REV. 297; (1925) 34 YAim LAW JOURNAL, "775. These writers agree that
various theories which have been suggested (i.e., that the banh may not
revoke because of estoppel, that the contract betwecn bank and buyer is
one for the benefit of a third party, the seller, and that the tran-action
constitutes a continuing offer on the part of the bank) are all unZatis-
factory, although any one of them might appear to be applicable in a
particular case. But the theory they consider most applicable-that the
bank-seller arrangement is a bilateral contract supported by con-ideration
moving from the buyer-is likewise obviously unsatisfactory if the contract
is to be held not only enforceable but irrevocable notwithstanding th bane
may have received no consideration from the buyer. For instance, in caze
the buyer's application is signed by an unauthorized agent, Ahould not the
credit still be enforceable by a bona fide seller?
6 Such a holding injects an element of uncertainty into the situation
which, if it were to become settled law, would be economically unfortunate.
From the standpoint of both bank and buyer it is desirable that a definite
fixed date should be reached at which accounts may be adjusted. If
credits were to remain contingent liabilities (in the accounting sene)
after their expiry date, either the bank would have to charge a higher
rate on new transactions between bank and buyer or otherwise limit credit
facilities available to the buyer. From the practice standpoint, it would
be extremely difficult in any given case to determine whether payment
should be made or not.7 The rule that the bank's undertaking will be construed with great
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While it is difficult to approVe of the particular application
of negotiable instrument law made by the court to this case,8 the
proposition that a letter of credit partakes of the nature of a
negotiable instrument may be helpful in resolving some of the
difficulties now faced by the courts. In order to be useful, how-
ever, the points of similarity and difference must be clearly
stated. Obviously a letter of credit is more nearly analogous to
a bill of exchange than to a promissory note. Suppose, then, that
in the instant case, the arrangement had been that the buyer
should effect payment by his draft upon the bank in favor of the
seller. Add the particular that the bank should accept condition-
ally,9 payment to be made against presentation of invoice on or
before the specified date. In such a case the rights and duties
of the three parties would be very similar to those they would
come under, as understood by the business world, were a letter
of credit in similar terms used.10 The principal difference is that
made apparent in the instant case, namely that there would
be no evidence of any obligation on the part of the buyer to the
seller br to any subsequent party.
What the actual evolution of letters of credit may have been
has apparently never been satisfactorily investigated. 1 That
strictness when the question is one regarding the sufficiency of documents
presented under the credit is supported by all of the letter of credit cases,
and, if applied in deciding a question as to whether a presentment after
the expiry date is sufficient, would preclude any possibility of holding as
the instant court did. Further, as the bank's obligation to the seller Is
normally in the nature of a suretyship obligation on behalf of the buyer,
all of the cases to the effect that a surety's contract will be strictly con-
strued should apply. Such may be the relation as between bank and buyer.
Cf. Border Nat'l Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 282 Fed. 73 (C. C. A. 5th,
1922). Obligations of a guarantor which are limited as to time will be
construed strictly. Cf. Solomon v. Waterbury Brass Goods Corporation, 6
Fed. (2d) 990 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
8 The obvious course would have been to have denied the discounting bank
any recovery against the buyer, leaving it to recover from the seller on the
seller's obligation as drawer. In such a case the principle relied upon by
the court might have applied so that the presentment, though late, would
have been sufficient to charge the drawer. If, however, the drawer were to
fail or to draw without recourse, the question of Whether the discounting
bank had any rights against the buyer would become important.
9 Such an acceptance would no doubt be binding according to its terms.
See Mason v. Hunt, 1 Douglas, 296, at 297 (K. B. 1779). No cases involving
a similar conditional acceptance have been found where the acceptor has
been held responsible on a presentation after the expiry date.
10 This comparison appears more clearly if one views as a single instru-
ment the buyer's application for the credit (considered as a drawing) and
the bank's issuance of the letter of credit (considered as an acceptance).
11 There have been many references both by courts and writers to the
similarity between letters of credit and bills and notes but no analysis of
the supposed similarity appears to have been made. For instance it is
said: "Letters of credit are instruments of frequent use in commerce, and
while not possessing all the characteristics of negotiability which pertain
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they are as ancient as bills of exchange, and were developed by
the same class, the early merchants doing international trade, is
well established. They may be used to serve almost identical
functions as above indicated although, of course, drafts con-
ditionally accepted would not meet the requirements of foreign
commerce. 2 This is evident when it is considered that the ordi-
nary credit may extend for a period of months and allow of many
shipments, the exact amount of which cannot be ascertained in
advance. Whether a letter of credit may be recognized by our
courts as a species of mercantile specialty 3 in many ways analo-
gous to bills of exchange may well be doubted. 4 On the other
hand, the effort of both courts and writers to reach the same end
on common law principles is strildng. But, if common law
principles are to be warped to this end, it seems probable that on
many points the law of bills of exchange may well serve as a
pattern.
In present practice the fact that the seller draws on the bank
under the credit tends to obscure the analogy suggested, that is,
that the seller is in the position of payee on the credit itself, if
to bills and notes, partake of them to such an extent as to be necezarily
classed as negotiable instruments." 2 DANML, NEGOTL.BLE INSTRMiMU-LS
(6th ed. 1914) §§ 1790-SOO.
To meet the argument of want of privity between one who had dis-
counted drafts drawn under a credit and the issuer, it has been said by
Story, J., "I have understood, and always supposed, that, in the commercial
world, letters of credit of this character, were treated as in the nature of
negotiable instruments; and that the party giving such a letter, held him-
self out to all persons who should advance money on bills drawn under the
same, and upon the faith thereof, as contracting with them an obligation to
accept and pay the bills." See Russell v. Wiggin, mpra note 1, at 230.
2 Marginal credits were at one time issued in England, the distinguish-
ing feature being that the credit instrument was attached to a blank
draft to be filled up and signed by the beneficiary. Cf. Maitland v. The
Chartered Mercantile Bank, 38 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 363 (18GO).
1L3 It is submitted that the essential elements of a letter of credit have
long been sufficiently definite to allow of its being treated as a specialty.
The discussion in the last few years concerning uniform forms has dealt,
for the most part, with questions of terminology as, for example, whether
the term bills of lading should refer to "on board" bills or "received for
shipment"I bills, or whether "policies" of insurance include "certificateo."
See, WARD, A2MRICAN COMMERCIAL CREDITs (1922) 102 ct scq. But whether
letters of credit fully measure up to the definition of a mercantile specialty
or not, there is every reason why a court today should, nevertheless, treat
it as though it were a specialty similar in many ways to a bill of exchange.
14 To a limited extent, and by apparently applying common law princi-
ples, the courts are already according letters of credit a particular status.
It, of course, is not suggested that they should hold that letters of credit
may in fact be negotiable instruments governed in all particularz by the
negotiable instruments law. On this point the decision of the New York
Court of Appeals regarding the negotiability of intcArl certificates is in-
structive. President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N. Y.
38, 150 N. E. 594 (1926); (1926) 35 YALE LW JouRNAL, S77.
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the latter be regarded as a bill of exchange., If, instead of
making the credit available by the seller's draft on the bank, the
letter of credit provided merely for payment, as is occasionally
done, on presentation of documents, the similarity would be much
more apparent. The provision that the seller should draw under
the credit serves several purposes. It is a convenient means by
which the seller in a distant place may avail himself of the credit.
Upon payment by the bank opening the credit, these drafts
serge as vouchers to be used to reconcile accounts with the buyer.
But most important, it contemplates the issue of an instrument
negotiable in form of which the bank is a conditional acceptor,
or at least which the bank is obligated to accept or pay." It
would seem to be clear from this that the parties intend the pay-
ment feature of a credit to be transferable, that is, the provision
that the credit is to be availed of by seller's drafts indicates the
intention that payment be made to seller or order-precisely as
would be the case if the buyer's draft in negotiable form were to
be issued.
It is an entirely different matter to consider whether the seller
can by assignment or otherwise designate anyone else to fulfill
the conditions of the credit, as by shipping the goods called for.
The seller on principles of ordinary contract law might assign
his rights under the seller-buyer contract 7  But, as noted above,
a letter of credit contemplates payment against documents only,
and this ordinarily before any goods have arrived. In fact the
bank may be entitled to indemnity although no shipment is ever
made. The buyer then relies largely on the character and stand-
ing of the seller. It is this narrow margin of security which is
afforded the buyer by having the seller himself procure the
specified documents, that justifies the buyer in arranging such a
credit at all. If the bank's contract with the seller is read in
the terms it is written, that is, that the bank will pay the seller
or to his order only on condition that drafts are drawn by the
seller and that the specified documents are provided by the seller,
it would seem impossible to hold that an assignee of the seller's
15 The discussion here relates to the ordinary irrevocable commercial
import credit, but it may with some modifications apply equally to other
forms, as for example, the confirmed credit. There is little distinction in
legal theory between an import and an export credit.
16 The promise to accept, being conditional, would probably not come
within section 135 of the N. I. L., so as to constitute an acceptance. Muller
v. Kling, 209 N. Y. 239, 103 N. E. 138 (1912). It is well establishcd, how-
ever, that the issuing bank is under a duty to the holder of the draft to
accept or pay. Russell v. Wiggin, supra note 1.
17 As a matter of practice banks provide in the buyer's application agree-
ment that the bank may at its option pay against drafts submitted by
receivers, trustees in bankruptcy, and others, in some degree representing
the beneficiary.
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rights on the sales contract might recover of the banh.2 To
revert to the illustration of the buyer's draft on the bank ac-
cepted conditionally-the analogy is good-the draft would be
transferable, but it would seem evident that no power would
be given to any transferee himself to fulfill conditions expressly
limited to the seller.
Following this line of thought, it will readily be seen that the
question of what constitutes consideration for the bank's obliga-
tion takes its proper place. It is elementary in the law of bills of
exchange that the payee (seller) may recover of the acceptor
(bank) provided only that he took in good faith, before maturity
and for value. The acceptance once given is irrevocable. The
drawer has no power to stop payment. The acceptor is bound
although the acceptance was subsequent to the giving of value
by the payee,", and, for that matter, even although no coni dera-
tion was given to the acceptor and the chawer's name was
forged. 10 None of the letter of credit cases appears to conflict
with any of these principles, viewing the credit as an accepted
bill as above suggested. Still there have been no situations
presented to the courts raising these questions as sharply as
they have arisen in the cases relating to bills of exchange. But
if the analogy here suggested were to be applied, credits once
issued in irrevocable form to a bona fide seller would be irrevoc-
able in the fullest sense, a result just as desirable as to credits
today as it was as to accepted bills of exchange in the days of
Lord Mlansfield. A seller, who has been provided with a credit,
wants assurance that it is as good as the bank writing the letter.
He does not want to feel that he must hurry to change his posi-
tion so as to work an estoppel. To make the credit subject to
revocation for reasons of which he knows nothing and which
ordinarily he would have no way of disputing, would be unfortu-
nate, however well sustained by ordinary common law princi-
ples.21
's Viewing the seller-buyer or seller-bank arrangements as non-pxr.-nsA
contracts, they are of course assignable. There are dicta to the ffecct that
an assignee might recover from the bank, but it does not appear evcr to
have been squarely held that he might perform conditions limited to the
seller and recover on the bank-seller contract. Cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Continental Bank of New York, 288 Fed. 979 (S. 1. N. Y. 1921).
29 Commercial Bank of Lake Erie v. Norton & Fox, 1 Hill, 501 (N. Y.
1841).
21 N. I. L. §§ 52, 57 and 62. Cf. Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1.51 (K. B.
1762).
21 It is assumed that although the seller would be in the position of payee
on the credit, he might in accordance with the better view as to bills and
notes be treated as a holder in due course. It would also seem fairly clear
that the seller's obligation to the buyer on the seller-buyer contract would
constitute "value." N. I. L. § 25. A more difficult question, however, may
be raised by the provision that when notice of an "infmity" is given to
YALE LAW JOURNAL
It will be noted that nothing here suggested conflicts with the
idea that the seller-buyer, bank-seller and bank-buyer contracts
are distinct. They should be so regarded, just as are the con-
tract§ of drawer, payee and drawee on a bill of exchange. In at
least one particular, however, courts appear to have gone farther
in recognizing this distinctness than they might have, had the
credit been regarded as a bill of exchange. In the O'Meara
case,2 2 the seller himself presented documents under a letter of
credit to the bank which had opened the credit, and payment
was refused because the bank had been advised that the seller
had not shipped goods of the required quality, although the docu-
ments in form complied with the stipulations of the credit. The
court was impressed with the argument that a bank could not be
expected to determine whether the merchandise shipped con-
formed to the seller-buyer's contract or not, and gave judgment
for the seller. But had the buyer given the seller a draft accepted
by the same bank, to use the analogy here suggested, and had the
buyer notified the bank not to pay for the same reason, the bank
would have been in just the situation the court thought impossi-
ble.2 3 Jt seems possible that, in the few cases where present-
ment is made by the seller himself under a credit, the inquiry
might well be whether the seller has acted in good faith and
given value, just as would be required in the case of an accepted
draft. Ordinarily the seller's drafts will be presented by a holder
in due course, so that the bank would be under a duty to pay,
a holder before he has paid all the agreed consideration, he may be a
holder in due course only to the extent of the amount actually paid before
notice. N. I. L. § 54. This section appears to have been applied only in
cases of partial payments as distinguished from partial shipments. See
BRANNAx, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (4th ed. 1926) 410-416. It codi-
fies the case of Dresser v. Missouri Construction Co., 93 U. S. 92 (1876)
relating to payments. It should be limited to such transactions. It is
much more important to a seller that his rights be determined at an early
date than it is to one who has merely undertaken to pay money. For
instance, if sugar is contracted to be sold at 23 cents and drops to 6 cents
before the seller has made actual shipment, it would, practically speaking,
entirely deprive the seller of his bargain to allow the issuing bank
(acceptor) to revoke (say for example in case of the buyer's insolvency)
on the ground that the seller had not performed his obligations to the
buyer before notice given. In support of this there is authority indicating
that, in case the seller's obligation to the buyer would not be affected,
section 54 would not apply. Griswold v. Morrison, 53 Calif. App. 93, 200
Pac. 62 (1921). Of course the right of anyone discounting the seller's
drafts under the credit without notice and for value would be protected, on
the theory here suggested, notwithstanding the bank's attempted revocation.
22 Supra note 2.
23 The decisions as to certified checks may throw some light on the prob-
lem although perhaps accepted drafts and certified checks are not treated
as being on the same footing. It is clear that a holder in due course may
require the certifying bank to pay although the drawer may attempt to
stop payment. N. I. L. § 57; Central Guarantee Trust Co. v. White, 206
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provided only the documents stipulated for were in proper order
and duly presented.
Applying the analogy above suggested to the facts of the
instant case, it may be said that the seller should be under a
disability to collect from the buyer so long as the credit is out-
standing. This would be comparable to the case where the seller
has received the buyer's draft. -  But the analogy to a bill of
exchange should not be pushed to the extent of allowing recovery
against the buyer (drawer) on the credit as if it were a bill
of exchange. Obviously the discounting bank holds nothing
evidencing any contractual obligation of the buyer to it. To give
a recovery, depriving the buyer of counter-claims good as against
the seller, would be contrary to the understanding of all parties
to the transaction. On the other hand, the discounting bank
would seem to be equitably entitled to the security to be found in
whatever rights the seller might have on the sales contract. The
purchase of the seller's draft under the credit accompanied by
the invoice of sale would evidence the intention of both parties
to transfer the seller's right against the buyer.25
Thus the analogy of letters of credit to bills of exchange, while
of value in many ways, has its limitations. This might be ex-
Pa. St. 611, 56 AtI. 76 (1903). But although the holder is not a holder in
due course, there appear to be some situations in which the drawer may
yet not be able to stop payment. Sutter v. Security Trust Co., 96 N. J. Eq.
644, 126 AtI. 435 (1924); (1925) 23 MiICE. L. REV. 531; Blake v. Hamilton
Bank, 79 Ohio, 189, 87 N. E. 73 (1903). When the holder is acting fraudu-
lently, there is apparently no justification for allowing him to recover. It
is possible that the O'Bleara case may be in accord on its facts with these
rules as to certified checks. But the language of the decision, in saying
that the bank need only regard the documents presented, would appear to
go much further.
24 In such a case it is clear that the drawer is under an immunity from
collection of the debt (buyer-seller contract) until the draft has been dis-
honored and due notice given. Whether a letter of credit is to be deemed
to be given in absolute or conditional payment remains to be decided. But
as the majority view as to bills of exchange is that they are given only as
conditional payment, it may be reasoned that the seller's rights against
the buyer on the sales contract would revive in case the bank issuing the
credit were to fail and reasonable notice were given the buyer. This
would meet the argument of counsel for the buyer in the present case to
the effect that merely providing the credit as agreed was a full perform-
ance on the buyer's part. Whether notice must be given as promptly as if
the credit were a bill may well be doubted.
25 Substantially this situation has been passed upon in a case where the
only document required in addition to the principal draft was the drawer's
draft on a third party. Although this second draft was never prezentcd, it
was held that a bank which had discounted the first draft was entitled to
the proceeds of the debt for which the second draft was drawn. Muller v.
Kling, supra note 16. Transfer of an invoice without bills of lading would,
however, probably not transfer property in the goods to the discounting
party, although it might transfer the debt. Cox v. Griel Broz. Co., 203 Ala.
250, 94 So. 292 (1922).
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pected in view of the rather specialized function which the
modern documentary credit has come to perform. But in decid-
ing new letter of credit cases there would appear to be every
reason for looking to the law pertaining to bills of exchange for
assistance. It would be preferable, and quite within the powers
of the courts, to recognize the letter of credit as a specialty in
many respects similar to bills of exchange.20  Perhaps, however,
all that may be expected will be an attempt to reach substantially
the same end by making use of modified common law principles.
R. B. T.
"CORPORATE ENTITY"-ITS LIMITATIONS AS A USEFUL LEGAL
CONCEPTION
The concept "corporate entity" has been so diversely explained
and criticized, that it does not seem amiss to question its present-
day usefulness-to query whether the harm which may result
from regarding a corporation as an "entity" is or is not greater
than the benefit which may accrue from using the term as a
shorthand device to express the result attained in a given situa-
tion. Two recent cases disregard the entity in order to reach
an equitable result. In Bressman, Inc. v. Mosson, 127 Misc. 282
(N. Y. Sup. Ct. App. T. 1926), the plaintiff corporation con-
ducted its business through A, its president. No shares had
been issued to B and C, each of whom had contributed one-half
the capital. A contracted, in his individual capacity, to buy
certain land of the defendant, paying the latter by checks which
he signed as president of the corporation. The corporation then
sued to recover the amount of the checks on the theory that the
defendant had notice that A was misusing corporate funds. The
lower court directed a verdict for the plaintiff. Held, that the
judgment be reversed on the ground that "the court will not
permit the fiction of the corporate entity to be used to per-
petrate a fraud." Inasmuch as there had never been a directors'
meeting, nor a payment of dividends, nor had any financial
statements been made to the shareholders, the court felt justi-
fied in announcing that the corporation was A's alter ego.2
26 For an interesting discussion of the Continental view of the letter of
credit, and a plea that, where possible, American law should be kept in
accord with it as an aid to international trade, see Hershey, Letters of
Credit (1918) 32 HARV. L. REV. 1.
1 See Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate. Entity (1912) 12 CoL. L.
REv. 496; Hogg, The Personal Character of a Corporation (1917) 33 L. Q.
REv. 76; cf. Canfield, The Scope and Limits of the Corporate Entity Theory
(1917) 17 CoL. L. Ruv. 128; Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and
Subsidiary Corporations (1925) 14 CALi,. L. REv. 12; see also (1925) 13
CALIF. L. REv. 235; (1920) 4 MINN. L. REV. 219; (1926) 10 ibid. 598;
(1923) 36 HARv. L. REV. 737.
2 The term alter ego as applied to a corporation is merely a statement
of the result reached in a given case-that on its facts the corporate entity
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In State Trust & Savings Bank v. Hernmosa Land & Cattle Co.,
240 Pac. 469 (N. Al. 1925) H, the president of a corporation, con-
tracted to sell its entire assets to W who paid part of the pur-
chase price in cash. In order to limit his responsibility, W ac-
cepted all the shares of the corporation in lieu of a transfer of
the property, and executed notes of the corporation for the bal-
ance of the purchase price to H as trustee for the old share-
holders. Subsequently, W discovered that H had made fraudu-
lent misrepresentations to induce the sale and refused payment
of the notes on this ground. In an action against the corpora-
tion on these notes, W was allowed recoupment for the fraud in
spite of the plaintiff's objection that the cause of action for
fraudulent misrepresentations belonged to W in his personal
capacity whereas this was an action against the corporation.
The court cited a number of recent cases to show that "courts
have looked beyond the corporate entity, not because it was
fraudulent in itself, but merely because to recognize it in the
particular case would result inequitably." 3
In order to discuss the soundness of such decisions it is neces-
sary to define-as far as definition is possible-the terms "cor-
poration" and "entity." The late Professor Hohfeld treated a
corporation as "just an association of natural persons conducting
business under legal forms, methods, and procedure that are ,"
generis. The only conduct of which the state can take notice
by its laws must spring from natural persons-it cannot be
derived from any abstraction called the 'corporate entity.' . .
When, . . . in accordance with the customary terminology,
we speak of the corporation, as such, as contracting in the cor-
porate name, as acquiring, holding, and transferring property,
and as suing and being sued, and when we speak of stockholders
as mere claimants against the corporation, holding stock, which
is a species of personal property,-and so on indefinitely-we
are merely employing a short and convenient mode of describ-
ing the complex and peculiar process by which the benefits and
burdens of the corporate members are worked out." -
Adopting this concept of a corporation it appears that little
remains to which we can attach the name "entity." The term,
as applied in law, merely denotes that in a given situation the
legal relations of the several associates in an enterprise will be
determined as if the associates were one, this being the simplest
wil be disregarded. It is synonymous with the term "dummy" or "mere
instrumentality."
3At 473, 474, citing Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Calif. 481, 202 Pac. 673
(1921) ; Pott v. Schrnucker, 84 DId. 535, 36 AtI. 592 (1897) ; Home Fire Ins.
Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N. W. 1024 (1903).
4HoaF=L, FUNDAmENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1923) 193, 200.
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procedure where it works no injustice.5 The mere fact of in-
corporation, i. e., the doing of the acts which by statute are
made conditions precedent to recognition as a corporation is
not solely operative to effect this result. If that were so the
law of corporations would, indeed, be simple. Corporations,
however, are not the only type of organization that has been
treated as an entity; nor is a corporation to be treated as an
entity at all times or for all purposes. A group of unincorpo-
rated associates has been recognized as an entity for the purpose
of being indicted for violation of the criminal law,0 of suing or
being sued,7 of levying upon the share certificates of its mem-
bers,8 of taxation, 9 and for the purpose of serving process."
Yet judging from the reluctance of many courts and writers to
disregard the separate entity as applied to corporations, one
would be led to believe that the "entity" was the unique and
distinctive quality of an incorporated group.
5 Sturges, Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions (1924) 33
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 383. Professor Dewey has recently criticized the reifi-
cation of the term "person" as applied to corporations--the "entity" con-
cept under a different name. "What 'person' signifies in popular speech,
or in psychology, or in philosophy or morals, would be as irrelevant, to
employ an exaggerated simile, as it would be to argue that because a wine
is called 'dry,' it has the properties of dry solids; or that, because it does
not have those properties, wine cannot possibly be 'dry.' Obviously, 'dry'
as applied to a particular wine has the kind of meaning, and only the kind
of meaning, which it has when applied to the class of beverages in general.
Why should not the same sort of thing hold of the use of 'person' in law?"
He suggests "eliminating the idea of personality until the concrete facts
and relations involved have been faced and stated on their own account:
retaining the word will then do no great harm." Dewey, The Iistorio
Background of Corporate Legal Personality (1926) 35 YAim LAW JouRNAL,
655, 656, 673.
G United States v. Adams Express Co., 199 Fed. 321 (W. D. N. Y. 1912).
The same joint stock company was, however, held not to be an entity in
Rountree v. Adams Express Co., 165 Fed. 152 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908) whore
the court refused to permit it to sue in the federal courts on the basis
of diversity of citizenship. Ace: Great So. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones,
177 U. S. 449, 20 Sup. Ct. 690 (1899).
7United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct.
570 (1922) (trade union). Contra: White v. Shipley, 48 Utah, 496, 160
Pac. 441 (1916) where plaintiff sued defendant, a joint stock company, as
a corporation, and the court denied relief because of failure to prove that
defendant was a corporation. A statute permitting actions against joint
stock companies in their common name was held inapplicable. Cf. Hanley
v. American Ry. Express Co., 244 Mass. 248, 138 N. E. 323 (1923) where
an automobile registered in the name of a trade union was held improperly
registered and relief denied for injuries inflicted.
8 Beal v. Carpenter, 235 Fed. 273 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916) (substituted service
at place where certificates were located, held to confer jurisdiction in rem,
the owner and physical property being in another state).
9 Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566 (U. S. 1870) ; People
v. Coleman, 133 N. Y. 279, 31 N. E. 96 (1892).
10 Adams Express Co. v. State, 55 Ohio, 69, 44 N. E. 506 (1896).
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The fact that, !or many purposes, corporations are denied the
entity attribute, while on the other hand many unincorporated
associations are often treated as entities for a particular purpose,
reveals the non-sanctity of the entity notion in any particular
instance. The most frequent case of "piercing the corporate
veil" is one where a third party seeks to impose individual un-
limited responsibility on the associates who endeavor to per-
petrate a fraud by treating themselves as distinct from the cor-
porate entity, and in nowise responsible for its acts. It is ob-
vious here that a strict adherence to thg entity theory would
place the courts in the anomalous position of aiding the de-
frauders while injuring the party defrauded. Brcssman, Inc. v.
Mosson is just such a case. Yet even there the lower court re-
fused to recognize that the corporation was merely the sole
shareholder under another name.
When, in the development of the law of corporations, the entity
theory had been brushed aside to permit an action in the federal
courts on diversity of citizenship"i it became apparent that the
fact of incorporation did not create a separate entity for all
purposes. The entity was soon disregarded to prevent fraud.V '
Courts of equity then made further inroads by rejecting the
theory in any case where, although no fraud existed, a rigid
adherence to the entity view would result inequitably.2 Courts
of law, especially under modern codes, soon followed. 4 At
present, there is a tendency to disregard the entity in cases not
involving fraud on the part of the associates, or equities of third
parties, if such procedure will facilitate the settlement of all
disputes between the litigants under the particular circumstances
presented to the court. The soundness of this liberalizing ten-
dency is clearly illustrated in State Trzst & Saviags Dan?0: v.
Hernosa Land & Cattle Co. Had the court adopted the theory
of its critics ' it could not have found any consideration for the
"Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch, 61 (U. S. 1809). Mar-
shall, C. J., is said to have regretted this decision. It was ov.rruled in
Louisville, C. & C. R. R. v. Letson, 2 How. 497 (U. S. 1844). See Wormser,
op. cit. supra note 1.
12 Booth v. Bunce, 33 N. Y. 139 (1865).
3 Cases cited supra note 3; United States Gypsum Co. v. Mackey Wall
Plaster Co., 60 Mont. 132, 199 Pac. 249 (1921).
14Wenban Estate v. Hewlett, 193 Calif. 675, 227 Pac. 723 (1924) ; Dillard
& Coffin Co. v. Richmond Cotton Oil Co., 140 Tenn. 290, 204 S. W. 753
(1918).
15 It is suggested, in (1926) 39 HARv. L. REV. 052, that the sole stock-
holder who had been defrauded "should be remitted to a separate action
against the persons who are responsible for his injury." It is submittcd
that such procedure would be a triumph of form over convenience, especially
in view of the present crowded court dockets and the saving of time and
expense in settling as many disputes as possible in one action. In (1926)
10 MINN. L. Rnv. 598, 608, the conclusion is reached "that except in those
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notes "since the corporation received nothing which it did not
already possess"; it would be "ultra vires the corporation" to
agree to pay the individual debt of a shareholder. Such were
the contentions of the defendant. On the other hand, it would
have found, as the plaintiff contended, that "any false represen-
tations concerning those assets worked no damage to the corpo-
ration, but affected only the value of the stock, and damaged
Wigmore only, and that his damage is not to be considered in a
suit solely against the corporation"; that the defrauder was the
corporation, acting through its president, and not the share-
holders (present plaintiffs); and that if W "suffered damage
through their falsity, his cause of action is against the corpo-
ration." In refusing to be trammeled by outworn theories of a
separate entity the court was able to look to the real nature of
this complicated transaction, to find consideration and to adjust
all the rights of the parties in one action.
In a recent Supreme Court case'0 a similar result was reached
at the behest of the sole shareholder. The defendant presented
a fraudulent claim against the Emergency Fleet Corporation of
which the United States was sole shareholder. Held, that this
constituted a conspiracy to defraud the United States1 T A con-
trary result was reached by a recent state court decision."' A
statute authorized a city to levy an assessment on landowners
for part of the purchase price of a street railway, should it
purchase the same. The city bought all of the shares therein
(rather than the property as such) and continued to operate the
railway as a corporation. The court invalidated an assessment
made within the purported terms of the statute on the ground
that the city had bought not the railway, but merely its shares
-that the corporation remained the real owner. It is submitted
cases where fraud or evasion of statute are present and no other means of
preventing it is available, the concept of a corporate entity separate and
distinct from its stockholders should not be lightly disregarded," and that
such cases as the instant one "are unnecessary triflings with an important,
essential and convenient principle of corporation law." It would appear
that a mere statement of the complicated facts in this case should be suffi-
cient to show the necessity of disregarding the "entity" here.
16 United States v. Walter, 263 U. S. 15, 44 Sup. Ct. 10 (1923).
17 Holmes, J., squarely placed the decision' on grounds of public policy
. .. while it is true that the corporation is not the United States
. . . the contemplated fraud upon the corporation if successful would
have resulted directly in a pecuniary loss to the United States, and even
more immediately would have impaired the efficiency of its very important
instrument." At 18, 44 Sup. Ct. at 11. Compare this with situations
where the same corporation was treated by the same court as a separate
entity, policy not dictating a contrary holding. Sloan Shipyards Corp. v.
Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549, 42 Sup. Ct. 386 (1921); Emergency
Fleet Corp. v. Wood, 258 U. S. 549, 42 Sup. Ct. 386 (1921); and see (1922)
36 HARv. L. Rv. 218.
is Chilson v. Sweeney, 247 Mass. 191, 141 N. E. 872 (1924).
COMMENTS
that these cases can be reconciled only as representative of di-
verse views as to the policy behind a particular statute. If the
court favors a broad construction of the statute the entity will
be ignored; if a narrower view is taken it is sustained by insist-
ing upon the separation of stockholders as such from the same
individual as a corporation. In a recent case19 a statutory land-
lord's lien was given for any supplies furnished by a landlord to
his tenant. F was the sole shareholder of the defendant corpo-
ration which owned premises leased to L. F individually owned
a store, but pooled both corporate and personal assets. Goods
were supplied to L from the store, for which a landlord's lien was
claimed by the corporation on the theory that F and the corpo-
ration were one. Held, that the two were separate entities, and
that therefore no lien would be given for the goods. It is not
unreasonable to believe that a contrary result might have been
reached had there been any compelling social policy to sustain
a lien in such a case.20
The conclusion to be drawn from these cases is that the term
"entity" merely signifies the result reached by a court in a given
case. Reasons for the decision should always exist independ-
ently.21. When so considered the term "entity" is useful only
because it is convenient. Where the same group of associates
is indicated as a unit in one case, and in another denied the power
to sue as a unit in the federal courts,22 it is obvious that the
individuals cannot be said to constitute "an entity." The result
reached in the first case is conveniently stated by an assertion
that they are an entity; and in the second case that they are not.
The term "entity," therefore, cannot be usefully employed apart
from the particular issue-and then only to state the result
reached. No hard and fast rule of what is "convenient' or
"equitable" or "just" can be laid down. Much depends on the
particular facts in a given case and the policy to be sponsored
by the court. The "courts will draw aside the web of entity,
will regard the corporation as an association of liye, up-and-
doing men and women shareholders, and will do justice betveen
real persons . . . where used as a cloak for wrongdoing
... . There could be no better refutation of the charge so
frequently made boris novissivis that courts are inelastic, un-
yielding and unwilling to respond to social and economic facts
than the adjustment-still in process-of corporate concepts to
19 Houston Nat'l Exch. Bk. v. Osceola Irrigation Co., 261 S. W. 56 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1924).
20 A similar result was reached in Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Commonwealth,
208 Ky. 606, 271 S. W. 693 (1925) where a disregard of the entity would
have exempted the petitioner from a tax assessment.
21 Sturges, op. cit. supra note 5.
22 Supra note 6.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
modern business facts." 23 That the adjustment has been and
still is in process is well illustrated by the recent cases which
allow the incorporators themselves to pierce the corporate veil
where no allegation could possibly be made that the associates
were using the entity as a "cloak for wrongdoing." Such prog-
ress is welcome and should not be hampered by a hypostatization
of the "entity" concept.
ENFORCEMENT OF THE 18TH AMENDMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATION
Since the repeal of the Mullen-Gage Law in 1923, New York
has had no statute to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment. The
inadequacy of the present federal judicial machinery to cope with
the enforcement problem by itself is clearly evidenced by the con-
gestion of the federal courts in New York. This situation has
raised the question as to whether state courts can prosecute
liquor cases in the absence of state enforcement legislation. In
the recent case of People v. Conti, 127 Misc. 244 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.
1926) the defendant, who had maintained premises for the sale
of intoxicating liquors (such maintenance being specifically made
a nuisance under the National Prohibition Act) 2 was indicted for
conducting a public nuisance in violation of section 1530 of the
New York Penal Law.3  The indictment was dismissed on the
ground that a violation of the National Prohibition Act is not an
offense against the state of New York, and also that no act was
alleged that is a public nuisance under the New York statute.
The sources of state and federal powers in the matter of
prohibition enforcement are independent-that of the state aris-
ing from its general police power, and that of the federal govern-
ment arising from the Eighteenth Amendment which also re-
stricted and limited the pre-existing power of the several states
so that no legislation enacted by them can give validity to acts
prohibited by it. 4 Each government may, however, enact laws
to enforce prohibition without interfering with the other. A
violation of a state enforcing act would be an offense against
that state only; and a violation of a federal enforcing act
would be an offense against the federal government only . A
single act, therefore, may violate both state and federal enforce-
23 Wormser, op. cit. supra note 1, at 517, 518.
1 As a result of a recent referendum, Montana is also without a state
enforcement act. N. Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1926, p. 1, ibid. Nov. 5, 1926, p. 4.
2 41 Stat. 305, (1919) U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1923) Title LXVIII A, §
10138.
3 N. Y. Ann. Cons. Laws (2d ed. 1917) 5940.
4 Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 236 Mass. 281, 128 N. V. 273 (1920); Ex
parte Gilmore, 88 Tex. Cr. App. 529, 228 S. W. 199 (1920); Dowling, Con-
current Power Under the Eighteenth Amendment (1922) 6 MINN. L. REv.
447; (1921) 10 CALIF. L. Ray. 70.
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ment statutes. Such an act is a separate offense against each,
and prosecution by the former one is no bar to prosecution by
the latter5 Under such circumstances, is it possible for a state
which has no enforcement statute, to prosecute a violation of the
federal enforcing statute?
In civil cases arising under federal statutes, state and federal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction, unless the matter is ex-
pressly reserved to the federal courts, for the state courts had
jurisdiction prior to the formation of the Federal Constitution.1
While some state courts have considered the exercise of con-
current jurisdiction optional," the Supreme Court in the Sccozd
Employers' Liability Cases" held that where a federal law re-
places state civil laws, under which state courts have been giving
remedies, it is incumbent on the state courts to take jurisdiction,
and apply the federal law. State courts, however, have no juris-
diction over acts which are crimes exclusively against the United
States, even when it is apparently granted by federal statute,
because no such power existed before the Federal Constitution,
and the Constitution does not sanction any such grant.- Hence
it would seem that state courts could not properly take jurisdic-
tion over a violation of any national enforcement legislation, even
if section 256 of the Judicial Code," which gives exclusive juris-
diction over criminal offenses against the United States to the
federal courts, were repealed.
The policy of permitting a state, by repeal of its enforcement
legislation, to shift the burden of enforcement to the federal
courts, and thereby lessen the effectiveness of prohibition, may
be questioned.12 The doctrine of the Second E nploycrs' Liability
5 United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 43 Sup. Ct. 141 (1922); Herbert
v. Louisiana, N. Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1926, p. 1, which confirms the Lanza
case.
6Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130 (1876); Stearns v. United States,
Fed. Cas. No. 13, 341 (C. C. A. 2d, 1835).7 Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 82.
8 Rushworth v. Judges, 58 N. J. L. 97, 32 Atl. 743 (1895) ; see Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 622 (U. S. 1842); Warren, Ncw Light wn the
History of the Federal Jdiciary Act of 17S9 (1923) 37 HEtnv. L. 9. 1 ,
70.
9 223 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 169 (1911).
10 State v. McBride, 1 Rice, 400 (S. C. 1839) overruling State v. Wells,
Hill L. 687 (S. C. 1835); see Martin v. Hunter, 1 'Wheat. 304, 337 (U. S.
1816); Stearns v. United States, svpra note 6, at 311. Contra: Hartley v.
United States, 3 Hayw. 45 (Tenn. 1816).
11 Stat. 76, (1789) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 1233.
32 "The eighteenth amendment has indeed opened an interesting field in
the operation of our dual scheme of government. It has brought into
strong relief the inadequacy of the organization of the federal government,
especially its judicial branch, to deal with so widespread a question as
prohibition; it has shown that state and national government machines
must operate harmoniously to put into effect a police policy declared to ba
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Cases"1 might be applied in criminal cases if the view werb taken
that state legislation is merely ancillary to federal legislation,
and that a violation of either is an offense against both govern-
ments. But this would be in conflict with the recent holdings as to
the relation of federal and state sovereignties in this situation
and as to former jeopardy. 4 Such a result would seem to be
more in keeping with Article VI, clause 2 of the Constitution"
which, apparently, has received little consideration in this con-
nection.
Apart from the problem as to the jurisdiction of state courts
over federal offenses, the question arises as to whether the facts
in the Conti case might not have been considered as the mainte-
nance of a public nuisance in violation of the New York penal
statute. This statute has been construed by the New York courts
as being merely a formulation of the common law definitions of
public nuisance.16 Hence it does not necessarily prevent any
given act from being a public nuisance because it is not specifi-
cally defined as such in the statute. In fact a place where intoxi-
cating liquors are sold has been held in some jurisdictions to be
a public nuisance, even in the absence of a statute specifically
defining it as such, if the sale was illegal under a state statute.',
A reason for this is the likelihood of public disorder resulting
from the enforcement of the state statute. The 18th Amendment
national, but affecting individuals so widely, and it has brought into the
open the inconvenience of a double system of police regulations of the same
article in the same country. The attempts made by the states and the
nation to meet the situation constitutes a chapter in our constitutional
development well worth watching. It also makes evident the wisdom of the
division of powers in the Constitution between state and nation and the
importance as a general rule of reserving the police powers to the state.
Only where the need is national, where it must be met by national action
should the nation seek to extend its scope of action at the expense of local
responsibility to local opinion, which is one of the cornerstones of the
constitutional system set up by the Philadelphia Convention in 1784."
Chamberlain, Enforcement of the Volstead Act Through State Agcncies
(1924) 10 Am. B. A. J. 391, 394.
13 Supra note 9.
14 Cf. United States v. Lanza, supra note 5; Herbert v. Louisiana, mtpru
note 5; Lanier, Prohibition and Double Jeopardy (1923) 8 VA. L. REa.
(N. S.) 740.
's "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the
Land and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
But see Dowling, op. cit. supra note 4, at 478.
10 People v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 165 App. Div. 711, 151 N. Y.
Supp. 547 (2d Dept. 1915), aff'd 216 N. Y. 658, 110 N. E. 1046 (1915).
17 Walt v. People, 46 Colo. 136, 104 Pac. 89 (1909); Lofton v. Collins,
117 Ga. 434, 43 S. E. 708 (1903) ; Parker v. State, 61 N. J. L. 308, 39 Atl.
651 (1898), aff'd 62 N. J. L. 801, 45 Atl. 1092 (1899); Smith v .Common-
wealth, 6 B. Mon. 21 (Ky. 1845).
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makes sales of intoxicating liquors illegal, and no legislation or
absence of legislation on the part of a state can make any such
sale lawful. A violation of the Amendment should be as great
a public nuisance as a violation of a state statute. A place where
a federal law is violated is just as likely to be the center of public
disturbances as premises where a state law is violated. The
term "public nuisance" is, at its best, a broad ambiguous term.
Whether or not a given group of facts wil constitute a public
nuisance often depends largely on the emotional reaction of the
court. It is submitted that the facts of the Conti case might well
have been held to have been such a nuisance. Further support
for this view may be gained from the fact that New York courts
have enjoined the maintenance of a place for the sale of liquor as
being a public nuisance.""
ANTICIPATORY BREACH OF UNILATERAL CONTRACTS
When there is an anticipatory repudiation by one party to a
bilateral contract, the other has an immediate right to damages
for the "breach."'I But this rule was limited by Chief Justice
Fuller's statement 2 that it applied only to mutually executory
contracts and would not allow an action upon contracts to pay
money, executory on one part only, before the time specified for
payment.3
Is United States v. Sumner, 125 Misc. 658, 211 N. Y. Supp. 705 (Sup. Ct.
1925), aff'd 216 App. Div. 732, 214 N. Y. Supp. 930 (4th Dept. 1926).
1 This is the English rule. Hochster v. de la Tour, 2 El. & B1. 678 (Q. B.
1853); Frost v. Knight, L. R. 7 Ex. 111 (1S72); The Danube & Blach Sea
Co. v. Xenos, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 825 (1863). See also discussion in note to
Cutter v. Powell, 2 SMIr's LrADING C, srs (12th ed. 1915) 43-50. The came
rule is followed in nearly every American jurisdiction. See cacs col-
lected in Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 780 (1900); ANSON,
CONTRACT (ComIN's ed. 1924) 463, n. 4; CoanrN, CASES ON C0N~nAcrs
(1921) 749, n; (1906) 1 ANN. CAS. 427; (1909) 12 ANN. CAS. 1103; 3
WILmSTON, CoxTAicrs (1920) 2363, notes 97, 98, 99; ibid. 2361, n. 1.
Contra: Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530 (1874); King v. Waterman, 55
Neb. 324, 75 N. W. 830 (1898) ; Stanford v. McGill, 6 N. D. 536, 72 N. W.
938 (1897) [overruled by Hart-Parr Co. v. Finley, 31 N. D. 130, 153 N. W.
137 (1915)]; (1924) 33 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 659.
2 "It has never been supposed that notice to the holder of a bond, or
promissory note, or bill of exchange, that the other party would not
(from any cause) comply with the contract, would give to the holder an
immediate cause of action upon which he might sue before the time of
payment arrived." Fuller, C. J., in Roehm v. Horst, cvpm- note 1, at 17, 20
Sup. Ct. at 786, quoting from the opinion of Taney, C. J., in Grecnway v.
Gaither, Fed. Cas. No. 5788 (C. C. D. Md. 1853).
3 Leon v. Barnsdall Zinc Co., 309 Mo. 276, 274 S. W. 699 (1925); Ben-
ecke v. Hoebler, 38 App. Div. 344, 58 N. Y. Supp. 10 (Ift Dipt. 1,
aff'd 166 N. Y. 631, 60 N. E. 1107 (1901); Moore v. Security Trust & L.
Ins. Co., 168 Fed. -96 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909), certiorari dcnied, 219 U. S.
583, 31 Sup. Ct. 469 (1910); see Roehm v. Horst, loc. cit. C':-pr note
2; Washington County v. Williams, 111 Fed. 801, 810 (C. C. A. Sth,
YALE LAW JOURNAL
The decision in the recent case of Federal Life Ins. Co. v.
Rascoe, 12 Fed. (2d) 693 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926) would seem to be
a step toward breaking away from this distinction drawn be-
tween anticipatory breaches of bilateral and unilateral contracts.
In this case, the plaintiff held an insurance policy under which
she was entitled to receive from the defendant a certain sum
each week so long as she was totally disabled. The payments
were made conditional upon her furnishing a report each month
from her attending physician. Although the plaintiff was dis-
abled for life the defendant ceased making payments after eight
months and denied any further obligation under the contract.
From a lump sum judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant
appealed on the ground that there can be no anticipatory breach
of a unilateral contract for the future payment of money. The
court, however, one judge dissenting, affirmed the decision of
the trial court.4
The doctrine of anticipatory breach has been attacked because
of the specious reasons often advanced by the courts in applying
itV The "reason" advanced by an early English case,0 and re-
1901); Alger Fowler Co. v. Tracy, 98 Minn. 432, 437, 107 N. W. 1124,
1126 (1906); Nicholas v. Scranton Steel Co., 137 N. Y. 4'71, 487, 33 N. fl.
561, 566 (1893); Ballantine, Anticipatory Breach and the Enforcement of
Contractual Duties (1924) 22 MICH. L. REv. 329, 350. "Indeed the right
to the unimpeached efficacy of the obligation before its maturity, is per-
haps as desirable in the case of a promissory note as in any other case
which can be put; yet it is probable that no court would enforce a promis-
sory note prior to the date of its maturity." 3 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra
note 1, § 1328.
4 The instant case is supported by the decisions holding that upon re-
pudiation by the insurer of all obligation under a life insurance policy, a
right of action to recover damages accrues at once. O'Neil v. Supreme
Council, 70 N. J. L. 410, 57 Atl. 463 (1904); Merrick v. Northwestern Life
Ins. Co., 124 Wis. 221, 102 N. W. 593 (1905). Contra: Kelley v. Security
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 186 N. Y. 16, 78 N. E. 584 (1906); Porter v. Ameri-
can Legion, 183 Mass. 326, 67 N. E. 238 (1903) ; Langan v. Supreme Coun-
cil, 174 N. Y. 266, 66 N. E. 932 (1903). "The contrary decisions of
Porter v. American Legion and Langan v. Supreme Council must be deemed
erroneous." 3 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 2369, n. 14. "That a
contract of insurance includes by necessary implication a promise on the
part of the insurer to accept premiums at the rate fixed by the original
contract seems obvious; and this had indeed been so held by the New York
Court of Appeals prior to its adoption of anticipatory breach." 3 ibid.
§ 1330.
r See Daniels v. Newton, supra note 1, at 532-541. Williston contends
that a plaintiff in bringing an action for breach of contract must allege
that the defendant broke the contract by not performing as promised-
something that obviously has not occurred in the case of an anticipatory
breach. Williston, Repudiation of Contracts (1901) 14 HARv. L. Rnv. 421,
428. See also 3 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 1296, 1306, 1311, 1313,
1316. "Suppose the defendant, after saying he will not perform, changes
his mind and concludes to keep his promise. Unless the plaintiff relying on
the repudiation, as he justly may, has so changed his position that he
COMMENTS
peated again by a recent commentator," was that a party "has
a right to have the contract kept open as a subsisting and
effective agreement. . ." But to say that a man has a
"right," and then contend that he should therefore have an ac-
tion for an anticipatory breach is to argue in a circle. The
"right," if present, is the conclusion, not a reason. In Hoehtc"
v. de lcs Tour the court said that if an instant right of action were
not given, it would be necessary for the wronged party to remain
ready and willing to perform his part of the contract without an
opportunity of benefiting himself to the extent of worldng at some-
thing else or of benefiting the defendant by mitigating damages.
Were this reason valid, the discrimination against actions for
anticipatory repudiations of unilateral contracts would be justi-
fied. But there is no such necessity, for a repudiation could
easily be held to give the injured party a privilege of not per-
forming his part of the contract, and make his right to damages
no longer conditional on his own readiness to perform, without
at the same time creating an instant right to damages. Indeed,
such was the holding in a leading Massachusetts case.8
This basis for the distinction between bilateral and unilateral
contracts in regard to anticipatory breach is, therefore, unsound.
"The best reasons for allowing an immediate action for an antici-
can not go on with the contract without injury, the defendant ought to be
allowed to do this. But if the plaintiff is allowed to bring an action at
once this possibility is cut off. 'Why,' says Fuller, C. J., 'should a Imi.-
poenitentiae be awarded to the party whose wrongful action has placcd the
other at such disadvantageT' Because such is the contract the partic3 made.
A promise to perform in June does not preclude changing position in May."
3 ibid. § 1321. But "it seems strange that the defendant, after renouncing
the contract, and absolutely declaring he will never act under it, should be
permitted to object that faith is given to his assertion, and an opportunity
is not left to him of changing his mind." Lord Campbell, C. J., in Hechster
v. de la Tour, supra note 1, at 690.
6 "The promisee has an inchoate right to the performance of the bar-
gain, which becomes complete when the time for performance has ar-
rived. In the meantime he has a right to have the contract kept open as
a subsisting and effective contract. . . . It is, therefore, quite right to
hold that such an announcement [repudiation] amounts to a violation of
the contract in omnibus and that upon it the promisee, if so minded, may
at once treat it as a breach of the entire contract, and bring his action
accordingly." See Frost v. Knight, s2,pra note 1, at 114.
7Ballantine, supra note 3, at 351. Professor Ballantine, however, recog-
nizes other and better reasons.
s "A renunciation of the agreement, by declarations or inconsistent con-
duct, before the time of the performance, may give cause for treating it
as rescinded, and excuse the other party from making ready for perform-
ance on his part, or release him from the necessity of offering performance
in order to enforce his rights. It may destroy all capacity of the party,
so disavowing its obligations, to assert rights under it afterwards,
if the other party had acted upon such disavowal." See Daniels v. Newton,
supra note 1, at 533.
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patory repudiation are that it frequently causes immediate loss
in property values, it disturbs the mind and serenity of the prom-
isee, an and immediate action makes for an early settlement of
the dispute and a timely payment of damages." 1 These apply to
unilateral as well as bilateral contracts. Repudiation reduces
the sale value of the chose in action, for few people care to pur-
chase a lawsuit. Also, the plaintiff should not be forced to bring
a series of lawsuits for the regular installments, and in the
meantime suffer discomfort and poverty.
But the court in the instant case purports not to depart from
the limitation imposed by Chief Justice Fuller, explaining that
there is no unconditional promise to pay a sum certain. The
plaintiff is regarded as being under a "continuing burden" of
submitting to physical examination and sending certificates to
the defendant and hence the contract was not considered uni-
lateral. The plaintiff has paid all the premiums due. But these
"burdens" were merely conditions precedent to the plaintiff's
right-conditions of a kind that are normally waived by anticipa-
tory repudiation such that the plaintiff's secondary right to dam-
ages is unconditional. 10 The dissenting opinion rested solely upon
the ground that the contract was unilateral and, therefore, in
view of Chief Justice Fuller's limitation, no action could be main-
tained. The exact contract is not made clear in the statement
of facts in the decision, but usually contracts of insurance are
unilateral. A person is insured in consideration of a first pay-
ment. Payment of later premiums is a condition precedent to
the right of the insured to collect on the policy. There may be
other conditions, as there were here, precedent or subsequent to
the right.
If the defendant's repudiation may be regarded as a present
breach, there is no difficulty in granting full damages even
though the contract is by its terms to continue into the future.11
Such damages are often granted, without judicial discussion as
9ANSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 464.
10 An anticipatory repudiation "causes the other party's secondary rights
to damages or restitution to be no longer conditional on performance or
tender thereof by himself." ANSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 465. In Ar-
kansas, the same result was reached under facts nearly identical with
the instant case. The court denied, without discussion, the defendant's
contention that the action was prematurely brought. Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Phifer, 160 Ark. 98, 254 S. W. 335 (1923). Likewise in Missouri, where
the plaintiff was the beneficiary of her husband's life insurance' policy
under which she was to receive a certain sum each week. The decision was
partly based, however, on an insurance statute. Millburn v. Royal U. M.
Life Ins. Co., 209 Mo. App. 228, 234 S. W. 378 (1921).
11 This is analogous to granting a plaintiff present and future damages in
one tort action. This practice is well recognized in Massachusetts, where
Hochster v. de la Tour is not followed. Parker v. Russell, 133 Mass. '74
(1882).
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to whether the contracts are unilateral or bilateral, in jurisdic-
tions where Hochster v. de la, Tour is followed with the limita-
tions imposed by Chief Justice Fuller. 12
A CONSIDERATION OF MECHANICS' BANK OP NEw HAVEN
V. JOHNSON
It has been consistently held that a mortgage note containing
an agreement to pay all taxes assessed on the note against the
payee or holder does not meet the requirement of section 1 of
the N.I.L.,' which provides that to be negotiable, an instrument
"must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum
certain in money." 2 The first Connecticut decision on the point,
Mechanics' Bank of New Haven v. Johnson, 104 Conn. 696, 134
Atl. 231 (1926) follows this view. As nearly all Connecticut
second mortgage notes and many of the first mortgage notes
contain such agreements, the holding is an important one in that
jurisdiction.
A study of the Connecticut statutes on taxation of mortgage
notes shows the reason for the almost universal use of this
provision. For some time prior to 1851, money at interest se-
cured by a mortgage on real estate was exempt from tax-ation.5
Acts passed in 1851 and 1852 removed this exemption, and made
it possible for the mortgagor, upon application, to have his tax
list reduced by the amount of such indebtedness.- Theoretically
this lightened the tax burden of the mortgagor at the expense
of the mortgagee, but the actual result, in many cases at least,
seems to have been the inclusion in mortgage notes of an agree-
ment on the part of the mortgagor to pay the taxes assessed
against the holder of the note. This practice was recognized by
a statute passed in 1875, which provided that mortgage notes
containing such agreements should be exempt from taxation "to
an amount equal to the assessed value" of the property mort-
gaged.5 As a result this agreement became practically universal
in Connecticut, and was incorporated in the printed note forms.
12 Pierce v. Tennessee Coal Co., 173 U. S. 1, 19 Sup. Ct. 335 (1800);
East Tennessee Va. & Ga. R. R. v. Staub, 75 Tenn. 397 (1881); Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Phifer, supra, note 10; Packas v. Hollingshead, 184 N. Y. 211,
77 N. E. 40 (1906); Millburn v. Royal U. M4. Life Ins. Co., Z.,p;a note 10.
I Adopted by Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) § 4359.
2 Coolidge v. Saltmarsh, 96 Wash. 541, 165 Pac. 50S (1917); Bright v.
Offield, S1 Wash. 442, 143 Pac. 159 (1914); Smith v. Myers, 207 IIl. 120,
69 N. E. 858 (1904); Carmody v. Crane, 110 Blich. 508, CS IT. W. 263
(1896); Farquhar v. Fidelity Ins. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 4G76 (C. C. E. D.
Pa. 1878).
3 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1838) 604, § 2.
4 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1854) 839, § 8; 849, § 41; 852, §§ 1, 2.
sConn. Pub. Acts 1875, c. 27; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1833) § 3824; Conn.
Gen. Stat. (1902) § 2319.
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Its universality is attested by the fact that the provision, which
enabled a mortgagor to reduce his tax list to the extent of his
mortgage indebtedness for which another was liable to be taxed,
was omitted in the Revision of 1902.0 The statute of 1875 re-
mained effective forty years; it was amended in 19151 so as to
make the inclusion of the agreement no longer necessary to
secure such exemption."
Thus the introduction of these agreements into mortgage notes
was brought about by a statute, the long continued existence of
which fixed its use firmly. If the agreement were still necessary
to secure exemption, or were it purely meaningless, except to
have given exemption under the above statute, it might well be
argued that its use should not make a note non-negotiable. How-
ever, such is not the situation. The agreement is no longer
necessary for exemption and while this was originally the pri-
mary reason for the inclusion of the agreement, it has had an
additional effect. In cases where the amount of the mortgage
note exceeds the assessed value of the property, it has re-
quired the mortgagee to bear the tax on such excess. The
amount of this tax can never be accurately determined at the
time of the execution of a note as the rate often varies from
year to year, and according to the residence of the holder. Fur-
ther, there is a possibility of new taxes being imposed after the
execution of the note. So although the primary cause for the
inclusion of the agreement no longer exists, this incidental ef-
fect, which clearly renders the sum uncertain, must be con-
sidered. Hence, such notes are non-negotiable.'
6 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1902) § 2349.; cf. Conn. Gen. Stat. (1888) §§ 3854,
3855.
7 Conn. Pub. Acts 1915, c. 125; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) § 1167.
SA vestige of the former exemption requirement still remains in Conn.
Gen. Stat. (1918) § 1184, which in defining personal property subject to
taxation says "but money secured by mortgage upon real estate in this
state, when there is no agreement that the borrower shall pay the tax,
shall be set in the list and taxed only in the town where said real estate
is situated."
9 As a matter of practice, mortgagees desiring negotiable notes should
omit such agreements. If such an agreement is desired, it should be
placed only in the mortgage, for (as pointed out by the court in the instant
case) such inclusion does not affect the negotiability of the note. Des
Moines Savings Bank v. Arthur, 163 Iowa, 205, 143 N. W. 556 (1913);
Page v. Ford, 65 Or. 450, 131 Pac. 1013 (1913); Frost v. Fisher, 13 Colo.
App. 322, 58 Pac. 872 (1899); Barker v. Sartori, 66 Wash. 260, 119 Pac.
611 (1911). Lenders accepting such notes as collateral, whose borrowers can
not prevail upon the mortgagor to give a new note which is negotiable,
should obtain an affidavit from the mortgagor that there are no existing
defenses or equities. This would give the lender protection except possibly
in cases of defenses or equities not then known to the mortgagor; for it is
doubtful that a lending of money in reliance on the affidavit would create
an estoppel against a mortgagor who was ignorant of an existing defense.
COMMENTS
This portion of the opinion of the Johinson case seems sound
(although it upsets nearly 75 years of settled practice) " but
the ultimate decision of the court is hard to justify. It appears
that on January 11, 1924, the defendant's mortgagee borrowed
$8,000 from the plaintiff, giving his own note for the amount
and collateral security. Part of the collateral was the defend-
ant's mortgage and mortgage note; these were assigned to the
plaintiff and the assignment recorded.1 Later, on January 18,
1924, a further loan of $8,000 was made by the plaintiff to the
mortgagee. During the following year the defendant made pay-
ments to the mortgagee amounting to $3,000 to be applied on
the defendant's mortgage indebtedness. The mortgagee used
these payments to reduce his indebtedness to the plaintiff, but
these payments were not applied on the defendant's note. In
January, 1925, the indebtedness of the mortgagee, originally
evidenced by his notes of January 11 and 18, 1924, was consoli-
dated into one note, and a new assignment of the defendant's
mortgage and mortgage note was given to the plaintiff and
recorded. Upon default of the mortgagee to pay the plaintiff,
this action was brought to foreclose the mortgage held by the
plaintiff as collateral, the mortgage note, given by the defendant,
being due and no payments having been credited thereon. The
lower court gave judgment for the plaintiff, treating the mort-
gage note as negotiable. On appeal, as above indicated, the note
was considered non-negotiable, and it was held that the second
assignment gave the defendant a power to set-off against the
plaintiff any payments made prior to it, although such payments
(made by defendant to his mortgagee) were subsequent to the
first assignment.
A provision in a note that collateral has been deposited for
I oAs the exceptions to the sum certain provision, specifically sct forth
in section 2 of the N.I.L., Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) § 4'60 do not include
this situation, the rule of statutory construction, "c.prcssio zni,.us cst cz-
elusio alteris" might be applied. This, together with the fact that the
holding makes for a uniform interpretation of a uniform act, gives it added
-weight.
"In most states recordation of an assignment of a mortgage and non-
negotiable mortgage note is provided for by statute, and is generally con-
sidered sufficient notice to invalidate subsequent payments on the note
to the mortgagee by a mortgagor's subsequent grantees. But many states,
including California, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Ilinois, Nebraska,
New York, Oregon, Utah, Wisconsin and Wyoming, specifically provide
that recordation is not sufficient notice to a mortgagor to invalidate such
payments. Massachusetts and Pennsylvania have also interpreted their
statutes in the same manner. However, a few states, including Indiana,
North Dakota, South Dakota, New Jersey and Maryland, have either
specifically provided otherwise or have reached that result by judicial de-
cision. Connecticut does not specifically provide for such a Zituation by
statute, and no direct holding on the point appears. See JONES, MMonaAGES
(7th ed. 1915) § 480.
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payment of "this or any other liability of - to the payee"
will allow the payee to apply such collateral to payment of other
debts as well as the indebtedness it was given to secure.12 So
in the Johnson case, as there was a similar provision in each
note given by the mortgagee to the plaintiff, 3 the defendant's
mortgage and mortgage note became collateral for the entire
$16,000 lent by the plaintiff. The new note given in January,
1925, was only a new form of evidence of the balance of the
indebtedness, for which the mortgage and mortgage note were
collateral, and which was originally evidenced by the notes of
January 11 and 18, 1924, there being no subsequent credits given.
As such, the new note merely operated to extend the time at
which the indebtedness came due. In this situation, the col-
lateral is not released, but remains continuously at the disposal
of the payee.14 So the giving of the second note could not have
effected an equitable release of the first assignment. Nor was
there any formal release. That assignment must, therefore, be
considered as still valid and binding, as was indeed found by
the trial court. The court recognized that notice of assignment
creates a disability on the part of a mortgagor to discharge his
indebtedness by making payments, on the mortgage note, to the
mortgagee. Hence, it would seem that there should have been
no set-off allowed in this case.15
12 Union Brewing Co. v. Interstate Bank & Trust Co., 240 Ill. 454, 89
N. E. 997 (1909); Commercial & Savings Bank v. Jenks Lumber Co., 194
Fed. 732 (N. D. Ohio, 1911); Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Demere, 92 Ga. 735,
19 S. E. 28 (1894); Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Brown, 53 S. W. 206 (Tenn.
1899). The effect of the inclusion of such an agreement would seem very
similar to that of an independent agreement as to the collateral. Cf. Na-
tional Bank of Commerce v. Pettibone, 125 Wash. 607, 217 Pac. 505 (1923).
13 The fact that the blank in such a provision is not filled in will not bar
recovery under it. "In supplying omitted words, which the context clearly
shows must be read in connection with it, to make the instrument the full
expression of the manifest intention and understanding of the parties to
it, the same is neither altered, varied, nor contradicted, but merely put
in the shape in which it was intended it should be at the time it was
executed." Oleon v. Rosenbloom, 247 Pa. 250, 93 Atl. 473 (1915); Beacon
Trust Co. v. Robbins, 173 Mass. 261, 53 N. E. 868 (1899).
14 "The principle is'too well settled to need citation of authorities that
the renewing of notes from time to time in no way extinguishes the original
debt. It is simply an extension of the time of payment, and a change as
to the evidence of the debt, and all the collaterals pledged for the pay-
ment would remain as security, not withstanding the extension of the time
of payment," Holland Trust Co. v. Waddell, 75 Hun, 104, 113, 26 N. Y.
Supp. 980, 986 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1894), aff'd 151 N. Y. 666, 46 N. E.
1148 (1897). Ace: Pond v. Clarke, 14 Conn. 334 (1841); Collins v. Dawloy,
4 Colo. 138 (1878); Wise v. Williams, 162 Fed. 161 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1908); Cotton v. Atlas Nat'l Bank, 145 Mass. 43, 12 N. E. 850 (1887);
Pattillo v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 197 S. W. 1054 (Tex. Civ, App. 1917).
15 Cf. Mitchell v. Cook, 29 Barb. 243 (N .Y. 1859).
COMMENTS
The court spoke of the second assignment as being part of a
"new transaction." It apparently then proceeded on the notion,
not sustained by authority in this situation, that for some in-
finiteshnaf time preceding the giving of the second assignment,
the mortgagee was the complete owner of the mortgage. That
being the case, the mortgagor's prior payments were deemed to
apply on his note, so that the second assignment of the note as
collateral was only of the balance yet unpaid by the defendant.
But it seems strange to say that the second assignment, while it
created no new beneficial rights in the assignee, operated to re-
move the disability created by notice of the first assignment. c
16 If taking a new assignment in connection with an ordinary renewal is
to be so treated, then the practice of taldng second assignments in any
case would seem inadvisable in Connecticut. Of course if the mortgage
note is negotiable, and if it is taken in good faith, for value and before
maturity, this difficulty does not arise. Otherwise, this decision mahes it
advisable to require an affidavit from the mortgagor whenever a second
assignment is taken. Whether this should be required in cases where the
first assignee sells to a second is not determined in the instant ease.
